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SECTION

9 OF THE

INCOME TAX ACT,

1961:

DEFACED AND DEFILED?
PRATEEK ANDHARIA*

The Income Tax Act is routinely amended by the Parliament.While well
reasoned amendments aimed at rectifying defects in the law are justified,
retrospective amendments, often a knee-jerk reaction to judicial decisions,
are inherently problematic.Thic is especially truefor the recent retrospective
amendments made to section 9 which have been couched as 'clarificatory'.In
this background,the paperseeks to examine these key amendments to section
9, tracing theiroriginin the relevantdecisions of the Supreme Court, briefly
discussingtheirvalidity againstPartIII of the Constitutionand the doctrine
of territorialnexus. In particular,it considers:first, the amendments to
section 9()(i) made in response to the Supreme Courtdecision in Vodafone;
second, the amendments to section 9(1)(vi) and the controversy surrounding
the meaning of 'copyrightedarticle' vis-a-vis 'copyright, third,section 9(1)
(vii) and the post-2007 perplexities that have engulfed it. The conclusion
presents how the Direct Taxes Code addresses these issues not only of
constitutionalitybut also of commercial reasonablenessand proposesa road
aheadfor our direct taxes legislation.
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i. INTRODUCTION
When Nani Palkhivala penned a fiery critique of the 4 2nd Amendment to the
Constitution, he most appropriately titled it Our Constitution: Defaced and Defiled)
Palkhivala, one of India's finest tax lawyers, saw the constitutional document as
sacred and knowing all too well the fate of statutes such as the Income Tax Act, 1961,
[Hereinafter, "the Act"] which were routinely amended to suit the Government's
whims and fancies, and he hoped the Constitution would not suffer a similar fate.
Palkhivala can rest in peace - the basic structure doctrine he persuaded the
Supreme Court to adopt has preserved the sanctity of the Constitution. 2 However,
what has not changed in the last three decades is the arrogant impunity with
which Parliament continues to tinker with the Act.3 That reasoned amendments
aimed at rectifying defects in the law or curing existing loopholes are justified is
trite law.4 This paper argues the unacceptability of mindlessly amending the Act
retrospectively, something done too often as a knee-jerk reaction to a decision of
the Supreme Court, and which creates more controversy than it clarifies.
The analogy of section 9 being defaced and defiled has been used to assist in
understanding how serious this perennial flow of amendments is and how these
have robbed the section of its original meaning, leaving it a shadow of its originally
crafted self. Section 9 forms a part of the charging provisions of the Act and creates a
legal fiction, deeming certain incomes to accrue or arise in India, and consequently,
rendering them taxable under section 5.5 Therefore, tinkering with these provisions
usually creates an entirely new substantive levy of tax and is hardly ever a mere
clarification, leading to significant tax implications for assessees. Very often, these

I
2
3
4

5

Nani Palkhivala, OUR CONSTITUTION: DFACED AND DEFILED (1976).
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
There were seven such amendments made in 2010 alone, and more than twenty-two
such amendments in 2012.
Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488 [Hereinafter,"Ujagar"]:
If in the light of such validating and curative exercise made by the legislature
granting legislative competence the earlier judgment becomes irrelevant and
unenforceable, that cannot be called an impermissible legislative overruling
of the judicial decision. All that the legislature does is to usher in a valid law
with retrospective effect in the light of which the earlier judgment becomes
irrelevant.
Uijagar, at 517. See also, National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation v.
Union of India, [20031 260 ITR 548 [Hereinafter,"NationalAgricultural" .
Sampath lyengar, LAw OF INCOME TAX, 74 (Rajaratnam ed., 11th ed., 2011).
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assessees enter into voluminous transactions on the strength of interpretations of
the statute handed down by the higher judiciary, only to be rudely surprised by a
slew of retrospective amendments in the next Budget, This also has implications
on India's position as a pre-eminent investment destination, as noted in a recent
Supreme Court decision.6
In this article I seek to examine certain key amendments to section 9 of the
Act, tracing their origin in the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, while
briefly discussing the validity of these statutory amendments against Part III of the
Constitution. I shall, following this brief introduction to the subject matter, discuss
in Part II of this paper the nature, the scope and content of section 9 of the Act so
as to set the background of the subsequent analysis. Part IIl
considers in particular
the amendments to section 9(1)(i) of the Act made in 2012. Part IV discusses the
amendments to section 9(1)(vi) and the controversy surrounding the meaning of
'copyrighted article' in contradistinction to 'copyright'. Part V examines in detail
section 9(l)(vii) and the post-2007 perplexities that engulfed it.My conclusion
presents how the Direct Taxes Code addresses these very issues and proposes a
road ahead for our direct taxes legislation.

II. UNDERSTANDING SECTION 9 OF
THE INCOME TAX ACT,

1961

Section 9 was designed as an aggregating provision, and it brought several
independent and scattered provisions from the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
together, collecting them under the head of 'incomes deemed to accrue or arise
in India'7 The section enacts into law a source rule of taxation,' deeming a whole
range of incomes, from interest and dividend to salary and royalty to 'accrue or
arise' in India for tax purposes. 9
These incomes, it must be noted, do not, accrue or arise in India per se and
hence, by employing a legal fiction, the legislature has drawn them into the tax
net due to their significant link with India." This section does not cover incomes
6
7

Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, 2012 (6) SCC 757, at 1 68 (Per
Kapadia C.J.) [Hereinafter,"Vodafone"l.
Kanga and Palkhivala, THE LAW AND PRAcTICE OF INCOME TAX, 367 (Dinesh Vyas ed.,
9th ed., 2004) [Hereinafter,"Kanga and Palkhivala"].

8

Explanatory Memorandum, Finance Bill, 2012.

9

Section 9(1), Income Tax Act, 1961.
Kanga and Palkhivala, supra note 7, at 368.

10
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that actually accrue or arise in India since "a fiction is not needed to create a situation
which exists in reality".' When discussing section 9, it is apposite to note that the
section does not, by way of legal fiction, alter the entity with respect to whom the
income arises, but rather uses the legal fiction to shift only the situs of accrual of
the income. 2
Section 9 covers within its ambit all persons, resident as well as non-resident
and is therefore, most inclusive in nature. 13 Due to its extremely wide import and
significant impact on the tax liability of non-resident corporations, the section
has been challenged as ultra vires the Constitution on the grounds of legislative
competence as well as violation of fundamental rights. 4 Nevertheless, the vires
of section 9 has been confirmed each time, with the Supreme Court as well as
numerous IHigh Courts declaring it to be constitutionally valid.'
In its original form, the section applied inter alia to business connections,
transfer of assets, income from property, dividend and salary. In the year 1976,
however, three additional heads of income were added, namely, interest, royalty
and fees for technical services. 16 These three additions substantially modified
the character of section 9 since liability was attached to non-residents based on
an extremely sound territorial nexus previously. Post-1976 however, the section
created liability for a non-resident in respect of his income outside India, even if
the contract from which the income arose was performed entirely outside India,
the only basis for attracting liability being the fact that the payment was made by
an Indian.
Palkhivala argues that as these additions to section 9 proceed on a grossly
inadequate territorial nexus, they are ultra vires and impermissibly operate with
extra-territorial effect. In his landmark work, he famously wrote:"7
If the Indian Parliament can cast the net wide enough to collect tax in
such cases where the foreigners income has no nexus with India only

II
12
13
14

15
16
17

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Oriental Co. Ltd., [1982] 137 ITR 777.
Kanga and Palkhivala, supra note 7, at 368.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhogilal, 25 ITR 50 (SC).
Abdul Azeez Dawood Marzook v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1958] 33 1TR 154; GVK
Industries v. Income Tax Office, [1997 228 ITR 564; ECIL v. Union of India, [19901183
ITR 43.
AH Wadia v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1949] 17 ITR 63.
Finance Act, 1976.
Kanga and Pakhivala, supra note 7, at 384.
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because the income is derived from a transaction with an Indian, it
can equally levy a tax on a hotel in a foreign country where an Indian
goes to stay or dine, or on a foreign store where an Indian buys shirts
or grocery, or on a foreign physician whose services are sought by
an Indian while abroad.
Incidentally, Palkhivala's words proved most portentous as it was exactly
these key aspects of extra-territorial operation and territorial nexus that the tax
authorities and the Supreme Court grappled with for over three years in the
context of fees for technical services under clause (vii). 8 The principles on which
the legal fictions created by section 9 are based, namely territorial nexus and
deemed accrual, are key to an understanding of how and why they have proved
so controversial and accordingly, must be borne in mind during the course of the
subsequent discussion. It is against this background that I shall now proceed to
consider three key clauses of the section and analyse their genesis, scope, judicial
interpretation and consequent amendment.

III. SECTION 9(1)(i):

SACRIFICED AT VODAFONE'S ALTAR?

A. Section 9()(i): A Primer
Section 9(1)(i) of the Act provides for the taxation of income from a variety
of sources, and is perhaps couched in the broadest terminology among the many
clauses of the section.1 9 Until recently, the most significant legal issues surrounding
the interpretation of this section concerned the meaning of the term 'business
connection', the question being what sort of business relationships constituted a
2
'business connection' under the Act. 0

18
19

20

Infra, Part V.
Section 9(1), Income Tax Act, 1961 reads:
The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India:
(i) all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or
from any business connection in India, or through or from any property in
India or through or from any asset or source of income in India, or through
the transfer of a capital asset situate in India.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. R.D. Aggarwal & Co, [1965] 56 ITR 20; Bangalore
Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 11950] 18 ITR
423; Great Lakes Carbon Corporation (No 1) v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 11993] 202
ITR 64, Here, it was a (prospective) amendment that inserted an Explanation defining
'business connection' and settling all interpretative controversy.
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Iowever, with the emergence of India as a preferred global investment
destination, trading in securities issued by Indian companies by non-residents
has become commonplace. Under the Act, the sale of such securities, when not
in the ordinary course of business, creates a liability to pay capital gains tax
and consequently, these parties have sought to devise creative ways around
this system.21 On the other hand, the Indian tax authorities have pursued these
transactions keenly, as more often than not, these were high value transactions
and the Department of Income fax [Hereinafter, "Department" was wont to
permit these non-residents to exit their investments without first extracting their
proverbial pound of flesh.
The five heads of income deemed to accrue in India under the section are
business connection, property, asset, source of income or the transfer of a capital
asset. The amendments I seek to discuss relate to the last head - that of transfer
of a capital asset situate in India. The well established principles relating to the
interpretation of this provision lay down three criteria for a transfer to be taxable:
a) existence of a capital asset, b) transfer thereof and c) situation of such capital
asset in India.Y
B. The Vodafone decision
While Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India'3 [Hereinafter,
"Vodafone"] was certainly not the first significant case that grappled with the
taxability of incomes arising from the transfer of capital assets in India, 24 it can
safely be described as the most important, both in terms of monetary value as well
legal consequences. 25The case concerned the transfer of control and management
of an Indian telecom company, effected by the transfer of a single share between
two non-resident companies, in the Cayman Islands. While on the face of it, the
transaction bore no nexus to India, the transfer of this single share abroad saw
assets worth over $11 billion change hands through a complex network of holding
21

See, Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. v. DDIT,242 CTR 561 (2011) (Bom), where the device of
'Permitted Transferee' was employed in a failed attempt to avoid tax. See also, Azadi
Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, 263 ITR 706 (2003).

22
23

Vodafone, supra note 6, at
Vodafone, supra note 6.

24

See Commissioner of Income Tax v, Assam Consolidated Tea Estates Ltd, [19871 167

25

ITR 215; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Quantas Airways Ltd, [20021 256 ITR 84.
Apart from importance in terms of the amendments that came close on the heels of
the Supreme Court decision, it must be noted that the amount in dispute was over $3
billion.

71.
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and subsidiary companies across the world.26
The huge sum involved in the matter saw the Department attempt to use the
case to set an example and push the limits of interpretation. What followed were
several orders, appeals and petitions across all tiers of the Indian judiciary. When
the Bombay High Court finally decided the matter in favour of the Department,/
lawyers, accountants and the business community attacked it vehemently as an
egregious misapplication of the law, setting the stage for an intense final battle
before the Supreme Court.
In a decision penned by the then Chief Justice of India, Justice SH Kapadia, the
Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the Bombay High Court's decision
on almost all counts. The Court discussed a variety of aspects of the transaction
in a lengthy, structured and well-reasoned judgment, but I will confine myself to
the points of principle on which much of the Supreme Court decision turned, as it
is these principles that were sought to be ousted by the subsequent amendments.
The Court held that the transaction was not taxable under the law as it stood
at that point in time. It dismissed the Bombay High Court's reasoning that there
had been, in addition to the transfer of the share, a simultaneous transfer of 'other
rights and entitlements' that constituted capital assets by themselves, rendering
the transaction taxable.2 8 The Supreme Court held that 'controlling interest' was
merely an incident of the ownership of the share and not an independent capital
asset capable of being transferred39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that,
contrary to the submissions made by the Department, section 9(1)(i) was not a 'look
through' provision, and did not allow for the taxation of indirect transfers, as such
an interpretation would render the express statutory criteria of the capital asset
being situate in India nugatory.3 In this regard, it rejected the contention of the
Department that alleged that the word 'through' in clause (i) meant'in consequence
3
of', holding this an impermissible extension of the statutory language. 1
26

27
28

The factual matrix of Vodafone in general and the parties' holding structure in particular
are extremely complex and a full description thereof would be beyond the scope of this
article. For an elaborate analysis, see, Nishant Sharma, The Vodafone Saga: TFax Planning
And CorporateVeil Piercing7 NALSAR STUDENT LAW RFvIEW 162 (2012).
Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2010) 329 ITR 126 (Born)
[Hereinafter,"Vodafone HC"].
Vodafone HC, supra note 27,at 136.
88.

29

Vodafone, supra note 6, at

30
31

Vodafone, supra note 6, at #171.
Vodafone, supra note 6.
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It was also held that there had been no 'extinguishment of rights' in the
present case, and consequently no 'transfer', a pre-requisite for the levy of capital
gains tax. This was concluded on the basis that the right that was alleged to have
been extinguished was the intangible right to nominate directors to the board of
subsidiary companies, which the Court held was not an enforceable right capable
of extinguishrnent.Y2 It was also opined that the situs of the transferred share could
not be determined on the basis of where the 'underlying assets' are located, but
rather where the share itself is situated.
C. The Post-Vodafone Amendments
Vodafone's Pyrrhic victory at the Supreme Court gave it respite for iust under
three months, for the Finance Act, 2012 quickly amended the statute to codify the
arguments that were rejected before the Supreme Court. As is always the case,
the amendments were proclaimed to be 'clarificatory' and 'for the removal of
doubts', intending only to explain the law as it always was and settle the apparent
'misunderstanding' created by judicial decisions." It is of significance that all of
the amendments were made with retrospective effect.
The amendments covered the length and breadth of the Supreme Court
decision, reversing almost every interpretation placed by the Court on the language
of section 9 and its allied provisions. The amendment process began from the very
basics, and started by altering all the relevant definitions. Section 2(14), which
defines 'capital asset' was amended to include 'any rights in or in relation to any
Indian company', specifically mentioning rights of management and control)3This
brought the law in consonance with the Bombay High Court ruling that such rights
were apital assets. Section 2(47) was amended to 'explain' the term 'transfer'
as including the disposition of any interest, including transfers characterised as
flowing from the transfer of shares of a non-resident 37
The charging section, section 9 came next, two explanations being appended
thereto. rhe first was as clear and unambiguous a rejection of the Supreme Court's
32
33
34

35
36

37

Vodafone, supra note 6, at 1 74.
Vodafone, supra note 6, at 1 82.
Explanatory Memorandum, Finance Bill, 2012. The language used to explain the reason
for amendment was simply: "Certain judicial pronouncements have created doubts about
the scope and purpose of Section 9
eion 3(), Finance Act, 2012.
Vodafone HC, supra note 27, at 136.
Sction 3(iv), Finance Act, 2012.
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decision as possible, stating that the term 'through" meant 'in consequence of,
thereby permitting the taxation of indirect transfers. 8 The second was as ambiguous
a provision as any, stating that a capital asset would be deemed to be situate in
India if it 'derived value substantially from the assets located in India' 39 Together
with amendments to the relevant tax deduction at source (TDS) provisions, these
amendments operated to nullify the effect of Vodafone.
In my opinion, the strongest challenge to the amendments would be against
their retrospective effect, Leading cases such as Ujagar Prints, and National
Agricultural clearly state, that a retrospective tax liability cannot be imposed
on a party by way of amendment.0 It is settled law that the only retrospective
amendments that can be made to a taxation statute are those that are clarificatory
in nature and any amendment that seeks to create a new substantive levy can
only be prospective." Further, it is well-settled that the clarificatory nature of an
amendment is to be judged not on the basis of whether it is inserted by way of
explanation or proclaims itself to be for the removal of doubts, but on the nature of
liability it creates.42 On this basis, the amendments mentioned above clearly disturb
the settled position of law and create a fresh liability and are by no means merely a
clarification of the existing law and consequently, can have only prospective effect.

IV. SECTION 9(1)(vi): A ROYAL(TY) MESS
A. Royalty income and Section 9(1)(vi)
Under the Act, before the amendment, the term 'royalty' was defined in
section 9 exhaustively, as meaning any consideration for the transfer of any rights
in respect of various intellectual property and services related thereto. 43 This
38
39
40
41

42
43

Section 4(a), Finance Act, 2012.
Section 4(a), Finance Act, 2012.
UjagarPrints,supra note 4; National Agricultural,supra note 4.
Id.
G.P. Singh PRINCIPLES or SrATUrTORY INTERPRETATION, 453 (8' h ed,, 2003).
Explanation 2 to section 9 read:
Explanation 2: For the purposes of this clause, "royalty" means consideration
(including any lump sum consideration but excluding any consideration
which would be the income of the recipient chargeable under the head
"Capital gains") for: (i) the transfer of all or any rights (including the
granting of a licence) in respect of a patent, invention, model, design, secret
formula or process or trade mark or similar property ...
(iii) the use of any
patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or
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definition of royalty was largely in consonance with international jurisprudence on
intellectual property and its taxability," The definition brought within the ambit
of 'royalty' sums payable or receivable on account of the transfer of various rights,
enumerated by way of Explanation.
The question whether receipts on transfer of software are assessable under
the Act as 'royalty' arose after the verdict of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy
Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh45 [Hereinafter,"TCS"I. There, the Supreme Court
held, in what is in my opinion a well considered decision, that software in a CD
was 'goods' and liable to customs duty under the Customs Act, 1962. The Court
arrived at this conclusion after considering a range of foreign decisions from US
and England, and making reference to several treatises on software licensing and
intellectual property." The rationale behind this decision was that even if the
relevant CD or floppy disk was a copyrighted article and carried with it certain
intellectual property, the language of the statute was wide enough to include such
property as 'goods'7
It is submitted that the decision operated on the basis of basic commercial
principles that clearly differentiated between the transfer of a right and the transfer

45

similar property; (iv) the imparting of any information concerning technical,
industrial, commercial or scientific knowledge, experience or skill ...(v) the
transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect
of any copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work including films or video
tapes for use in connection with television or tapes for use in connection with
radio broadcasting, but not including consideration for the sale, distribution
or exhibition of cinematographic films; or (vi) the rendering of any services in
connection with the activities referred to in sub-clauses (i)to (iv), (iva) and (v).
Explanation 3 to section 9 read:
"Explanation 3: For the purposes of this clause, "computer software" means any computer
programme recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device
and includes any such programme orany customized electronic data."
V. Niranjan, A Software TransferAgreement and its Implicationsfor Contract, Sale ofGoods
and Taxation 8 JOURNAL OF BusiNEss LAW 799 (2009).
Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 12004] 271 ITR 401.

46

First National Bank of Springfield v. Department of Revenue, 421 NE2d 175 (1981);

44

Compuserve INC. v. Lindley, 535 N.E. 2d 360; St Albans City and District Council
v. International Computers Ltd., (1996) 4 All ER 481; Roger Pressman, SoFTWARE
ENGINEERING (1996); Rahul Matthan, Tui LAW RELATING TO COMPuTERS AND TE INIERNETr
(2000).

47

TCS, supranote 45, at 1 44. The Court gave an analogy to a valuable painting, reasoning
that surely tax could not be levied only on the canvas and paints just because the final
work was created with investment of intellect and was a copyrightable work.
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of a good. The question of royalty can only arise when a 'right' is transferred and
not on the transfer of a good per se. Merely because a good has an element of
intellectual property, its sale cannot be taxed as royalty, since such a transaction
clearly constitutes a sale simpliciter and not an assignment of rights.41 It must be
noted that such sales agreements usually carry extremely restrictive covenants as
to modification and use. Therefore, the characterisation of such transactions as sale
and such commodities as goods was legitimate and justified.

B. The Rigmarole Begins - Interpretation,Re-Interpretation and Mis
Interpretation
However, the decision seemed to produce an unintended consequence.
Assessees were quick to apply this ratio, albeit pronounced in a wholly different
context, to argue that when a particular software was sold, especially if it was
'shrink-wrapped', 'canned' or 'off the shelf' software, there was a transfer only of
a 'copyrighted article' and not the transfer of a 'copyright' per se. The consequence
of this was that any payment made or received in this regard was not assessable as
'royalty' under clause (vi) and its corresponding provision in the relevant double
taxation avoidance agreement [Hereinafter,"DTAA"I. The position quickly gained
currency and was endorsed by a Special Bench of the Delhi tribunal as well as the
Authority for Advance Rulings [Hereinafter,"AAR"].49
Following this, most practitioners believed that the law was settled and that
such transactions could not be assessed for the purposes of royalty income under
section 9. They were proven wrong when the Delhi Bench of the ITAT surprised
everyone by taking a contrary view and holding the assessee liable to tax under
clause (vi)Pm It must be noted that this view was contrary to the earlier special bench
ruling of the very same tribunal and can be described as per incuriam.
What followed was a series of conflicting decisions by different tribunals, the
AAR, and various High Courts. Some followed the ratio in TCS and upheld the
48

49
50

This principle is well explained by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in Sonata
Information Technology v. ACIT, (2006) 103 ITD 324, at 3 (Bang):
The assessee had sold the software bought in fully packed condition as received from
the overseas vendor to various customers in India without opening the package.
The assessee acquires during the course of business a copyrighted article whereas
the copyright remains with the owner or the seller. What the assessee acquires is the
material object available off the shelf which is different from copyright.
Motorola Inc. v. DCIT, [2005195 ITD 269 (SB); Dassault Systems KK v. DIT, (2010) 229
CTR 105 (AAR).
Gracemac Corporation v. ADIT, (2010) 134 TTJ (Del) 257.
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essential difference between 'copyright' and 'copyrighted articles' while others held
assessees liable to tax, on the principle that the right to use the copyrighted article
created in itself a liability to tax under the head of royalty income. The Mumbai
bench of the ITAT and the Delhi High Court took the former view, respecting the
fundamental commercial difference between the two and exempting assessees
from liability." The Bangalore Tribunal, the Karnataka High Court and the AAR
however, subscribed to the latter view and held against the assessee. 2 However,
some semblance of order seemed to return to the field when both the Mumbai
and Pune Tribunals followed the former view in early 2012, thereby introducing
a degree of consistency in the law.Y Alas, this respite was short-lived.
C. The Amendment and its Validity
While the amendments to section 9(1)(i) got the lion's share of media and
critical attention following the budget, a key amendment was made to clause (vi)
as well. The Finance Act, 2012 inserted three new Explanations to this clause, and
brought within the tax net income arising from the transfer of computer software.
The amendment nullified, with retrospective effect, all the decisions that had
favoured the assessee and instead, took the view of the Karnataka High Court.
The Explanation declared that the expression 'transfer of rights in respect of
property' in Explanation 2 'always included' the right to 'use a computer software'.
It then went further and stated that the possession or right and its location in India
were irrelevant factors in determining whether a particular income was royalty or
51
52
53
54

ADIT v. TII Team Telecom International, 140 TTJ (Mum) 649; DIT v. Ericsson AB, 12012]
343 ITR 470 (Delhi).
CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., [2012] 345 ITR 494 (Kar); In Re Millenium IT
Software Ltd., 62 DTR 1 (AAR); ING Vyasa Bank v. DDIT, (2012) 143 TrJ (Bang) 249.
DDIT v. M/s. Solid Works Corporation, [ITA No. 3219/MUM/2010, 8/01/20121; Allianz
SE v, ADIT, [20121 51 SOT 399 (Pune).
Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) reads:
Explanation 4: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the
transfer of all or any rights in respect of any right, property or information
includes and has always included transfer of all or any right for use or right

to use a computer software (including granting of a licence) irrespective

55

of the medium through which such right is transferred. Explanation 5:
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the royalty includes
and has always included consideration in respect of any right, property
or information, whether or not: (a) the possession or control of such right,
property or information is with the payer; (b) such right, property or
information is used directly by the payer; (c) the location of such right,
property or information is in India,
CITv. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., [2012] 345 ITR 494 (Kar).
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not.56 In essence, the amendments did not 'clarify the law' as it purported to do,
but rather sought to modify completely the meaning of the term 'royalty' itself.
For, how else can a determination as to whether an income is royalty income or
not be independent of the possession or control of such right?
It is submitted that the proposition put forth by the amendments is bad in
law and untenable, being contrary to the fundamental principles of commercial
law in general and intellectual property rights law in particular. Nevertheless, the
Department seemed to have acted in undue haste and without fully considering
all the consequences of the amendment. The aspect of DTAAs and their definitions
of royalty were completely ignored in the zeal to twist the law - significantly
handicapping the actual utility of the amendments. All of India's DTAAs carry
definitions of royalty similar to the un-amended clause (vi) and since the assessee
can, under section 90(2) of the Act pick the Act or DTAA, whichever is more
beneficial, the amendments have proven toothless.
In the case of DDITv. B41. InternationalHoldings Ltd., 7 this is exactly what the
Bombay Tribunal held, granting the assessee exemption based on the DTAA. Article
7 of the DTAA applies to income in the nature of business profits, derived from a
permanent establishment. Therefore, in the absence of a permanent establishment
and with the income being held to be not in the nature of royalty payments, the
assessees could take benefit of the treaty and wind up with no tax liability. The
classic proverb of 'haste makes waste' rings truer than ever for the Department,
which amended section 9 all for naught.
V. SECTION

9(1)(vii):

TECHNICAL NUANCE TURNED TO

TECHNICAL NONSENSE

A. The Ishikawajimacase and subsequent uncertainty
Section 9(1)(vii) was one of the first provisions of section 9 to generate
significant controversy in Indian tax jurisprudence regarding extra-territorial
operation.- The provisions of section 9(1)(vii)"9 were relatively unambiguous
56
57
58

Section 4(b), Finance Act, 2012.
Ishikawajima Harima I leavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT, (IATNo. 880/Mum/2005).
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v. CIT (1990) 183 ITR 43. See generally, Prateek
Andharia, The Validity ofRetrospective Amendments to the Income Tax Act
Act and Ishikawjima Harimas case 4 NUJS LAw REviEw 269 (2011).
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S-ection 9 of the

Section 9(1), Income Tax Act, 1961 read:
The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India: (tii)
income by way of fees for technical services payable by - (a) the
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until 2007, when the Supreme Court ruling in IshikawajimaHarima Heavy Industries
Ltd. v. DIT [Hereinafter,"Ishikawajima"] laid down a new test for taxability of
fees for technical services rendered by a non-resident. Justice Sinha, delivering
the judgment for the bench, stated that for such fees to be taxable, the services
61
concerned must be (a) utilised in India and (b) rendered in India.
This decision, which upset the settled position of law as it had stood for more
than thirty years, led to complete confusion in Indian tax administration. Perturbed
as the Department was by the new interpretation put forth by the Court and its
consequences on the taxability of lucrative services transactions, an amendment
in the law was ensured within months and incorporated in the Finance Act, 2007.62
This was done by an Explanation inserted below section 9(2), with retrospective
effect from 1976. The Explanation essentially stated that the incomes mentioned in
Section 9(1), sub-sections (v), (vi) and (vii) would be included in the total income
of the non-resident, regardless of whether the non-resident had a 'residence, place
of business or business connection in India'.
However, this amendment turned out to be inadequate to change the
exposition of the law as stated by the Supreme Court. In Jindal Therial Power Co.
Ltd. v. DCIT,6 the Karnataka High Court held that while the amendment clearly did
away with the criteria of residence, place of business and business connection, the
twin criteria of rendering and utilising services in India laid down by the Supreme
Court in Ishikawajimaremained unaffected by the explanation." The Bombay High

Government; or (b) a person who is a resident, except where the fees are
payable in respect of services utilised in a business or profession carried on
by such person outside India or for the purposes of making or earning any

income from any source outside India; or (c)a person who is a non-resident,
where the fees are payable in respect of services utilised in a business or
60

61
62

63
64

profession carried on by such person in India or for the purposes of making
or earning any income from any source in India.
Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT, 2007(3) SCC 481.

It is the submission of the author that this decision was erroneous on various counts.
These shortcomings are detailed in Worley Parsons v. DIT, 223 CTR (AAR) 209,
discussed later in this paper.
Explanation to section 9(2) read:
Explanation - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the
purposes of this section, where income is deemed to accrue or arise in
India under clauses (v), (vi) and (vii) of sub-section (1), such income shall
be included in the total income of the non-resident, whether or not the nonresident has a residence or place of business or business connection in India.
Jindal Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, t20061 286 ITR 182.
The Karnataka High Court even stated that "it is explicit from the reading of Section 9(i)
(vOii)(c) and the explanation to section 9(2) that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in
Ishikawajima'scase still holds the field". Id, at 1 6.
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Court upheld this interpretation in its 2008 ruling in Clifford Chancev. DCIT.6
The amendment next came up for adjudication in Worley Parsonsv. DIT,66
before the AAR in 2009, in which several hitherto disregarded aspects of the
Ishikawajimajudgment were brought to light. For one, the Supreme Court's entire
judgment revolved around section 9(1)(vii)(c), which deals with payments for
fees for technical services made by a non-resident, while in that case the fees were
payable by a resident, the Indian company Petronet LNG. Secondly, the criterion
of 'rendering' was nowhere to be found, even in the inapplicable clause and was a
completely new and extraneous addition by the Supreme Court. However, stating
that 'we have to respect the observations of the Supreme Court and the spirit behind
it, without invoking the doctrine of per incuriamas far as possible', the underlying
principle of the judgment i.e. applying the test of a territorial nexus while taxing
transactions under section 9, was respected.

B. The Final Amendment
The matter was sought to be resolved finally by Parliament vide the Finance
Act, 2010, which amended the previously inserted Explanation under section
9(2) to, in words as precise and clear as possible, do away with the two pronged
test laid down in the Ishikawajima decision. 67 in Ashapura Minichem Ltd. v. ADIT' 8
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, for the first time since April 2010, had the
opportunity to adjudicate on the position of law after the amendment. It held that
the test laid down in Ishikawajima was no longer valid in light of the retrospective
amendment, which incidentally took retrospective effect from way back in 1976.

65
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67

68

Clifford Chance v. DCIT, [2002] 82 ITD 106.
Worley Parsons v. DIT, 223 CTR (AAR) 209.
Explanation to section 9(vii)(2) read:
Explanation - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the
purposes of this section, income of a non-resident shall be deemed to accrue
or arise in India under clause (v) or clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section
(1) and shall be included in the total income of the non-resident, whether
or not, (i) the non-resident has a residence or place of business or business
connection in India; or (ii) the non-resident has rendered services in India.
Ashapura Minichem Ltd. v. ADIT, (2010) 5 TMN 57 (Mum). See generally, Linklaters
LLP v. tTO, (2010) 6 TMN 38 (Mum- ITAT):
As the law stands now, utilization of these services in India is enough to
attract its taxability in India. To that effect, recent amendment in the statute
has virtually negated the judicial precedents supporting the proposition
that rendition of services in India is a sine qua non for its taxability in India.
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However, the unanswered questions that still persist are whether the grant
of extra-territorial taxing power in section 9 by the new amendment is ultra vires
the constitution and if so, whether such power can be granted by a retrospective
amendment. These issues are not new and have been discussed at length
previously,69 but in the light of the latest amendment, assume special significance
in Indian tax jurisprudence.
C. The ConstitutionalValidity of the FinalAmendment
It is submitted, with respect, that the new interpretation of section 9, which
has now found legislative recognition through the amendment in the Finance
Act, 2010, will be contrary to the well-settled international norms of taxation on a
foreigner in respect of his income accruing, arising and received outside the taxing
State. It is also against the spirit of the various tax treaties entered into by India
with foreign countries, though a charge imposed by domestic law does not, and
cannot supersede those treaties. 70Such a situation, in which the Parliament confers
on the Department powers to cast the net of taxation far and wide, would lead
to patent unreasonableness in so far as transactions of foreigners will be taxable
irrespective of a real territorial nexus with India.
Section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act, read with the newest amendment, seeks to
charge a foreigner in respect of his income outside India only because the payment
is made by an Indian resident for mere utilisation of services, even where the income
arises under a contract which is made and performed entirely outside India and
neither the income nor the contract has any real connection with India. The Supreme
Court in fact, read in the additional criterion of 'rendering of services in India', so
as to uphold the fundamental principle of territorial nexus! 1 By expressly removing
this criterion by way of the latest amendment to section 9, Parliament has shown
utter disregard to the principle of territorial nexus, since now, mere utilisation of
a service by an Indian resident is supposed to constitute adequate territorial nexus
for the purposes of imposing tax liability, a most untenable proposition.
69

70

British Columbia Electric Railway Company Limited v. The King, (1946) A.C. 527,

approved in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v. CIT, (1990) 183 ITR 43; G.V.K.
Industries Ltd. v. ITO, 11997] 228 ITR 564 (AP). In Electronics Corporation of India
Ltd.'s case, the matter was further referred to a Constitution Bench but the case was
withdrawn before it came up for hearing.
This was the principle laid down the Supreme Court of Canada in Queen v. Melford
Developments, 82 DTC 6281, which was later upheld in Citizen Watch Co Ltd v, IAC,
[1984J 148 iTR 774. Section 90 of the Act embodies this very principle as it states that
"the provisions of thisAct shall apply to the extent they are more beneficial to that assessee".

71

ishikawajima, supra note 60.
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It is submitted that in the absence of any rational or reasonable territorial
nexus, section 9 is unconstitutional as it attempts to tax enterprises providing
services outside India, the basis of such extra-territorial operation being devoid
of any real territorial nexus. Palkhivala opines that that if the scope and validity of
these clauses were to be questioned before a court of law, the alternatives before
the court would be either to strike down the provisions as ultra vires the legislative
powers of the Indian Parliament or to read down the provisions and restrict their
scope only to those cases where the facts and circumstances demonstrate a sufficient
territorial nexusj
The most basic line of reasoning against such a challenge is that section 9
simply purports to tax any payments by a resident, made on account of fees for
technical services and since fees for technical services fall under the head of income,
such payments fall under the Parliament's legislative competence." Further, given
competence, if it is the will of the legislature to tax certain transactions, it can do so
and the Constitution further extends this right to permit extra territorial legislation
as well,7 by way of Article 245(2). However, this argument is overly-simplistic and
suffers the basic flaw of not taking into account the principle of territorial nexus,
which has been re-affirmed several times as one fundamental to any source-based
taxation regime7' Furthermore, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has
recently stated that legislation having no nexus with aspects and causes within
India is ultra vires the competence of Parliament.'
Therefore, it is the submission of the author that the extra territorial operation
of section 9, to the extent laid down in the newest amendment is unconstitutional.
A challenge to the vires of the amendment may also be levelled on the basis of
Article 14 and Article 19, but a detailed discussion thereof is beyond the scope of
this article. 7
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Kanga and Palkhivala, supra note 7, at 384.
Entry 82, List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India 1950: "Taxes on income other
than agriculturalincome". When read with Article 246(1), the Parliament derives its
power to legislate on all taxes on income. For the purposes of the Act, section 9 read
with section 5(2)(b) and 4(2) of the Act ensure that such income becomes chargeable
to tax in India
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
Sijbren Cnossen, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES AND O PTIONS
FOR REFORM 103 (2000); Brian J. Arnold, TiE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 65 (1986); Edwin van der Bruggen,
CURRENT TRENDS IN ASIAN AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 182 (2002).
GVK Industries Ltd. v. ITO, (2011) 4 CC 36.
For a detailed analysis of the constitutional validity of the amended section 9, see,
Andharia, supra note 58.
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Vi. CONCLUSION

'Those who do not learnfrom history, are doomed to repeat it.'
- George Santayana
One cannot deny the fact that amendments are an essential legislative tool
and have great utility in clarifying the law when controversy emerges, for the
object of any interpretative exercise is to ascertain the intention of the legislature,
which no one can supply better than the legislature itself, What are problematic
are retrospective amendments, made in a post-facto manner to overcome adverse
decisions of the Courts. An amendment, especially to a taxation statute, must always
be prospective in nature, unless it operates purely as a clarification.
The above three examples I have chosen to discuss are just a microcosm
of what has been long been set practice in taxation law, and a keener analysis
will surely reveal hundreds of situations such as these over the last fifty years7n
What is perhaps most worrisome is that the Department never seems to learn
from its numerous mistakes and continues to bring in amendments in haste to
overcome adverse judgments. As of today, the draft Direct Taxes Code contains
all the provisions as newly amended - surely, they are condemned to repeat their
follies unless a new mechanism is evolved. I would propose that if there is in fact
an adverse decision of a court that interprets the law against the Department's
intention, a high-powered committee or group under the CBDT should be tasked
with its review and only then should amendments be recommended. Furthermore,
as far as possible, such amendments should be only prospective in nature.
These measures would introduce consistency in Indian tax law, a feature
woefully absent at present. Furthermore, such a considered multi-tier review and
recommendation process would avoid situations such as those that have arisen
under clauses (vi) and (vii), where a hasty amendment was added, only to be
interpreted by the courts as insufficient to overcome the relevant judicial decision.
India is one of the world's fastest growing economies and a major destination
for foreign investment. Nevertheless, the one thing that investors look for when
investing their funds, apart from commercial gain, is certainty and consistency in
the legal regime governing their investments. Taxation law has a major role to play
in creating such a conducive atmosphere for investment and to that end, it is hoped
that reforms to our system of amending the Act are made as soon as possible, if
78

Kanga and Palkhivala, supra note 7, at 2.
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our position as a preferred investment destination is not to be lost. While no such
systemic change appears to be on the cards, in the words of Alexander Pope, 9
hope springs eternal.

79

Aiexander Pope,

AN ESSAY ON MAN,

I (1733)

TH

LAW OF CON IMPI IN LIGHT OF SAHARA V SBI

JLPsT1cF

M ] C4NNAI) A RAO)(Kb IL).) .............................................

INVESTOR-ST AT

ARITRATION IN TIMES OF CISIS

R DOUG JON .. ....

PROF S

I

27

.................

ADJUDICATION OF SOClO-ECONOMIc RIGHTS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF
SouTH AFRICA: WALKING THE TIGHTROPE BEITWEEN ACTIVISM AND DEFERNCE?
PROFEFSSOR AVINASH1 GOvJNDILE ....................................................

6

A SIMPLE THOUGHT-EXP-RIMENT: TURING GAM S WITH A UNIFIED
CODE OF PROCI)UR
FE GU" RRA-PU]OLI & SYDI'A

THl!N, - ROBINSON .......................

SCHRODINGERS CONSTITUI'IONAL CAT: LIMITS 01- 11

.

...

81

HIGH COURT'S

DFCLARA[TION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
.HVPRASAD
.WM1NAbHAN
...............................

SECTION 91

PRATILt

-1(0

TUF INCOME TAX ACT, 1961: DEFACED AND DEFILED?

k A\NDIARI---------------------------------------------------------------1............................191

